Book Extract: An Emanden General Look Back on the 1948 Indo-Pak conflict

Copyright © HT Digital Streams Limit all rights reserved. General Sm Shrinagesh (courtesy of Penguin Random House India) Summary Shrinagesh, the second staff chief of the army, led a military attack against Pakistan shortly after independence in early May 1948, the Jammu and Kashmir Force were divided into two. One was located in the southern sector and the other in the valley. Sporadic fights have continued for some time without tangible results on either side. In order to regain the initiative, Lt Gen. (Later Gen.) KM Cariappa, who took over as an army commander, Western Command,, because of the larger powers involved, to place these two sectors under one commander, which accounted for him directly. In September 1948, I was selected for this task and I named the Corps Commander, V Corps, which consisted of 26 Infantry Division under Late Maj. Atma Singh with the headquarters at Jammu, the 19th Infantry section under Maj. Gen (the late Gen.) KS Thimayya headquartered at Srinagar and an independent sub-area under Big. (Later Maj. Gen.) Jai Singh for the security of the line of communication (L van C). Also read: ‘White Lilies’: Life and Death on the average roads of Delhi These areas provided a wide range of terrain and climate, including Arctic conditions in the mountainous areas of Zoji la and Gurais, hilly terrain in Uri, jungle in Jhangar and plains in Jammu. They also contain the 260 mile long Pathankot-Jammu-Srinagar road, which was the lifeline of the troops, as well as of the civilian population. This lifeline was a dangerous route that crossed the Banihal Pass at 9000 feet, which was blocked by heavy snow in winter. The Himalayan areas were also snow-dressed and troops that had never seen snow work there before. The military situation in Jammu and Kashmir in early September 1948, when the assignment was united, was far from satisfactory. Our garrisons at Leh and Poonch were isolated, and Pakistan increased her pressure. Our L or C Jammu-Srinagar was threatened by infiltrations from the east and from the West. Although Pakistan launched no major attacks, our L van C Jammu-Naushehra was also very vulnerable. The threat to Jammu lies in his proximity to the border of Pakistan, and to Naushera in the strong Pakistan build-up in the vicinity of Bhimber-Sadabad. The fights around Jhangar, Uri and Tithwal were stabilized, and Pakistan committed her regular troops in these areas supported by mountain and field guns. In the case of URI, they also produced medium guns. Look at the complete image of the book cover. For India, the military situation in Kashmir was adversely affected by political considerations. Pakistan had no legal or moral right, in light of the express wishes of the people and his ruler, to work with his army in Kashmir, while India did. India referred the case to the UN, which set up the UN Commission on India and Pakistan (Uncip), for which both parties came to an agreement to refrain from offensive actions that would probably exacerbate the situation. Due to the strict compliance with this agreement, India could not use her air force in its primary role in isolating the battlefield by attacking the offer and communication base of Pakistan, or attacking Pakistan’s installations on the Indian side of the border, within Kashmir, such as Muzaffarabad and Mirpur, due to possible escalation. On the other hand, Pakistan made full use of the silence caused by the agreement to build its power and supplement its powers in the J&K area, in such a way that Poonch and Leh were systematically surrounded. For Leh we had an alternative means of communication via Manali, but the route was long and expensive between June and October and only usable. However, Poonch was so carefully invested that our supply aircraft could not end up there, while Pakistan constantly used artillery, and shells often fell among the refugees who gave us shelter. The general situation in September 1948, with Leh and Poonch at risk, was therefore militarily unhealthy, but was forced on us – an example that weapons are the servants of political policy. Pakistan continued to aggravate the situation and achieve greater power against the two isolated garries and prepare him to defeat them, and they did not take a look. The problem was whether we should evacuate these two garris zone or force a link. Also read: Upamanyu Chatterjee is master of the absurd in his new collection. The gaps in our line were from Baltal via Kargil to Leh and from Rajori to Poonch. Pram Baltal to Kargil (50 miles), the track was snow -tied during the winter, while it was open from Kargil to Leh (150 miles) throughout the year. Rajori to Poonch was only a distance of 50 miles, but this route ran across a series of high series and deep valleys without any tracks. If Kashmir was not allowed to be captured by Pakistan, we had to close these two gaps and connect these Garrisons. To achieve this goal, we have carried out two assistance. Excerpt from ‘Commandant by Destiny: A General’s Rise from Soldier to Statesman’ with permission from Penguin Random House India. Catch all the business news, market news, news reports and latest news updates on Live Mint. Download the Mint News app to get daily market updates. More Topics #Books Mint Specialies