Power is monopolized in Ukraine

Copyright © HT Digital Streams Limit all rights reserved. The Economist 5 Min Read April 19, 2025, 07:11 AM ist Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. (AP -Photo) Summary critics say the presidency becomes too powerful and makes mistakes. Behind the indescribable facade of a light industrial building in Kyiv, is an eclectic crew of video players, architects, scientists and filmmakers mass-producing depth drones and speed missiles. It does not look like former style defense types, but it transforms Ukraine’s war. Three years ago they made 30 drones a month. Now they are up to 1.300 a month, ranging from slow drones ($ 580,000 for a set of ten) to a new ballistic rocket (at $ 1MA piece). It costs a fraction of what foreign does, and is based on open source designs, which means they are not bound by foreign use restrictions. “We do not want dependence on America’s politics,” said the founder of the firm, whose name for security reasons cannot be disclosed. When Russia launched its full -scale invasion in 2022, the war control of Ukraine was completely dependent on American and European supplies. Over the past three years, its own military manufacturing capacity has gone from $ 1 billion to $ 35 billion from material a year, according to Oleksandr Kamyshin, a presidential advisor who oversees the industry. Faster than anyone would have predicted, Ukraine becomes self -sufficient in many types of weapons. But big gaps remain. Ukraine still cannot make systems to extinguish incoming Russian missiles. Manpower is another problem. Mobilization was treated incorrectly: the rotations of troops away from the front are rarely; Draft agents arbitrarily grab people; and the government hesitated to lower the age of service. Yet the army has grown, and elite units still attract recruits. Most importantly, Drones has sharply reduced the numerical benefit of Russia: according to some estimates, 75% of all casualties suffered by the Russian army are administered by them. The worst fragility of Ukraine may not be military, but political. Since the start of the war, many liberal and moderate Ukrainians have faced a dilemma. Attention to incompetence, government corruption or mismanagement is risking undermining international support. But keeping quiet means accepting the increasing monopoly of power of Volodymyr Zelensky, which sometimes undermined the state’s efficiency and even the war effort itself. “While Western media and European leaders have Zelensky Leeuwers and have turned him into a celebrity, we feel trapped,” says Yulia Mostovaya, the editor of Zn.ua, an independent online. If the criticism of Mr. Zelensky was difficult before Mr. Trump attacked him in February because he was “a dictator”, it is now impossible. Ukrainians gathered around the president to such an extent that he was considering holding elections. “If Zelensky feels that he has no competitors, it means that elections are approaching,” says one official. In preparation for its possibility, the state seems to tighten its grip. In February, Petro Poroshenko, which leads the largest opposition party, was penalized for unspecified “threats for national security”. His assets were frozen. He is also charged with ‘high treason’ in a lawsuit looking at critics like Lawfare. The sanctions hinder him to dispute any election. However, many Ukrainians do not like Mr. Poroshenko, but many consider it a dangerous precedent. “If Poroshenko can be banned from an election process without any court decision, someone else could be so,” said Olexiy Honcharenko, a member of Ukraine’s parliament, the Rada. Civil society activists are also plagued. Vitaly Shabunin, a crusader against corruption, who moved in the first days of the war, while also exposing the graft in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, has long been targeted. His latest investigation complied with Snide Vengeance. To punish him, he was sent near the front; Details of his work are sent to the authorities daily. Such methods remember Vladimir Putin’s early years of power, says Mr. Shabunin, at least in their smallness. The politics of Ukraine are far from Russia, and concentrating power is a natural consequence of war. But some of the Ukraine’s strongest supporters are increasingly concerned that things are going too far. It is true, the democracy of Ukraine was never really based on the rule of law. Pluralism was provided by the diversity of its regions, the competitive interests of its power groups, and a vocal civil society that relied on the support of Western embassies and the media. But all these checks are weakened or removed. In the name of efficiency, power is not concentrated in government or parliament, but in the hands of some unelected officials in the presidential administration, including Andriy Yermak, the Chief of Staff, Dmytro Lytvyn, Mr. Zelensky’s speech writer and Oleh Tatarov, who has the security agencies. The administration is reluctant to share power, not only with opponents, but also with someone who is seen as a potential rival. Loyalists are rewarded with seats on the boards of state firms. Those who show too much independence, have too much popular support or enjoy direct communication line to Western countries, have been fired or killed. These include Valery Zaluzhny, the popular commander of the Ukrainian forces, who was removed in February 2024 and sent to Ambassador in London. Others pushed out include Oleksandr Kubrakov, a former infrastructure minister; Dmytro Kuleba, a former Foreign Minister; and Mustafa Nayem, who led the Reconstruction Agency. Differences and critical media are seen as a threat, rather than a strength. Sevgil Musaeva, the editor of Ukrainska Pravda, the country’s leading independent online publication, complains that the presidential office instead of dealing with the reasons asking for journalistic investigations is responding by limiting access, directing advertisers and seeing any contact with the journalists as betrayal. “It’s not systemic censorship, but if we don’t resist, the free space will disappear before we know it,” she says. The Ukraine’s movement to more authoritarian rule is surprising, given the pressure it faces, as the war hone until the fourth year. The risk is that it undermines the country’s self -organizing resilience. Like Mr. Honcharenko puts it: “We have shown that a small democracy can withstand a greater autocracy and turn itself into an porcupine. But a small autocracy can be swallowed by a larger one.” © 2025, The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved. 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